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The relation between theoretical models and metaphors has been studied since at least the 1950s. The relation between metaphors and mathematical modelling is less well researched. This article takes the media coverage of the foot and mouth modelling exercise in 2001 as an occasion to examine the metaphors of mathematical modelling that were proposed by the UK press during that time to make sense of this new scientific policy tool. One can detect a gradual change in metaphor use by the newspapers from conceptualising modellers as detectives and models as mapping tools to modellers as soldiers and heroes to modellers as liars and models as tools to distort the truth. This seems to indicate a shift in reporting from seeing models as a legitimate and ‘objective’ basis used by decision makers to pursue science-based policies towards seeing models as tools used to legitimise increasingly difficult political decisions.
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 “The availability of increasing computer power at declining cost makes the possibility of modelling [and its impact on science] all the greater.” (Yearley 1999, 846). This has had a direct impact on the modelling of climate change for example, but also impinges on scientists’ ability to model mathematically the progress of emergent and infectious diseases, to forecast the likely outcome of an epidemic or pandemic, to help manage disease outbreaks or to advise on control strategies, such as biosecurity measures and slaughter.
In 2001 quantitative epidemiological models were used strategically, tactically and operationally (DEFRA 2003) in decision-making, management and intervention during a major outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) in the UK. FMD is the most contagious viral disease affecting cloven-hoofed animals, in particular sheep, pigs and cattle and can have devastating consequences for the European export market, especially to the US and Japan, which depends, since 1992, on the disease free status of the national herd (Woods 2004).  As the virus spread faster and in more unexpected ways in 2001 than during previous outbreaks in the UK (the last big one having occurred in 1967), epidemiologists and epidemiological modellers were called upon not only to monitor the spread but also to assist in real-time disease-control management and to help choose between policy options, such as various types of slaughter or vaccination or a combination of both. One of the most drastic and most controversial policy decisions guided by epidemiological modelling was the so-called ‘contiguous cull’ of animals on neighbouring farms which might or might not be infected with FMD. This policy was introduced when it was thought that culling infected holdings alone was insufficient to bring this particular epidemic under control (Woolhouse 2003, 127)
Newspaper reporting on the modelling done during the FMD crisis provides a unique occasion for studying the ways in which modern societies use scientific expertise and scientific tools, in this case mathematical models, during an ongoing epidemic and the ways the media try to make sense of this process. In this paper I want to focus on the metaphors deployed in the UK press to discuss the computer models used to inform disease control policies. These metaphors provided the newspaper readers with tools for the public understanding of a new type of science used for disease control purposes. The questions I would like to answer are: What metaphorical tools did the papers employ to make sense of this new scientific and technological tool? Were the metaphors they used novel or old, that is, was the novelty of the policy tool reflected in the novelty of metaphors used or not? And: Which aspects of the modelling exercise did the metaphors used by journalists highlight or hide (the models, the modellers or the outcome of the models)?
The paper therefore deals with the way that scientific models, which can themselves be regarded as metaphors or as being based on metaphors (see Ravetz 2003; Brown 2003; Amsterdamska, 2005), underwent metaphorical transformation as they came into play in the larger world of public concerns and asks what happened in the transition between the sphere of science, science-based policy and the mass media.
The media offered the most important forum for makings sense of computer models during the outbreak, just as mathematical models came to be seen by some policy makers as the most important forum for making sense of the epidemic. In both cases models and metaphors were important sense-making tools, as models may be seen as scientists’ metaphors and metaphors may be seen as lay people’s mental modelling devices. The paper focuses on the way the one, media metaphors, was used to make sense of the other, mathematical models.
Making sense of modelling was part of a larger enterprise of making sense of the, at the time, rather strained relationship between science and society, between abstract theories and happenings on the ground (Bailey, et al. 2006), but it was also connected to an effort of making sense of the people that were engaged in bringing the disease under control: veterinarians and experts on animal diseases, the modellers and the government advisors. Stresses and strains appeared between various factions, especially veterinary experts and epidemiological modellers (Bickerstaff and Simmons 2004), but also between experts included and experts excluded from the core FMD advisory group. As Haydon, Kao and Kitching (2004, 677) have pointed out:

The new and important role of quantitative modelling in real-time disease-control management reflects technological developments (such as powerful computers and spatial data), the maturing of quantitative epidemiology as an academic discipline and unusually direct communication between leading epidemiologists and senior government scientific advisors. More importantly, it reflects a growing awareness of the need for rigorous data analysis, which was highlighted by the experience with BSE in the United Kingdom.

Quantitative epidemiological modelling and those involved in it became the focus of scientific and social debate, contest and friction and the focus of metaphors used to make sense of it and of them.

Background
The FMD outbreak in 2001
In 2001 the UK experienced an outbreak of FMD of unexpected magnitude. As summarised by one of the modellers involved in trying to control it:

Foot-and-mouth disease was confirmed in the UK on 20 February 2001. Retrospectively, by that date there were at least 30 (and, according to some estimates, over 50) incubating cases, widely disseminated from south-west Scotland to Devon, largely through extensive movements of sheep through sheep markets from a focus around the putative index case in Northumberland. By 23 February, when a national ban was imposed on livestock movements, the number of incubating cases had approximately doubled. The large number and wide distribution of cases made this epidemic particularly difficult to control … Ultimately, there were over 2000 cases and the epidemic lasted until the end of September 2001. Over one million livestock were slaughtered on infected holdings, a further three million (mostly sheep) were slaughtered for disease control purposes, and a further two and a half million were slaughtered for welfare reasons. The total cost has been put at £3 billion directly and a further £5 billion indirectly (Woolhouse 2003, 126-130).

The FMD Scientific Advisory Group
The ministry responsible for dealing with an animal disease epidemic such as FMD was at the time the Ministry for Agriculture, Farming and Fisheries (MAFF), replaced during the epidemic by the Department for Environment, Farming and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). MAFF initially used traditional measures of disease control, such as movement restrictions, biosecurity and hygiene advice to farmers, and slaughter of infected animals. However, as the epidemic progressed more rapidly and unpredictably than expected the government set up a Scientific Advisory Group under the leadership of Sir David King, the government’s Chief Scientific Advisor, which was to inform FMD policy and set it on a more ‘scientific’ footing.
As far as one can ascertain, on 6 March, about two weeks into the crisis, a meeting was organised by Sir John Krebs, the then chair of the Food Standards Agency (FSA). At this meeting Imperial College, Cambridge and Edinburgh epidemiologists met, but MAFF was not represented. On 14 March MAFF provided the Imperial College team with data on the disease between report to confirmation of infection, and confirmation to slaughter. By 16 March MAFF suspected that the epidemic was out of control. On 21 March a meeting was held between MAFF, the FSA, epidemiologists, the Chief Vet Jim Scudamore, and the government’s Chief Scientific Advisor Sir David King. In an interview with Newsnight the same day Professor Roy Anderson of Imperial College, a leading infectious disease expert said: “I think everybody is in agreement, both government, the farming community and the independent scientific advice that this epidemic is not under control at the current point in time”. (Newsnight transcript 2001) On 23 March MAFF issued a press release that stated:

The outlook for FMD in Great Britain 2001 is for a very large epidemic… 
The Ministry of Agriculture and the Food Standards Agency held a joint meeting on 21 March to receive urgent advice from independent expert epidemiologists. Jim Scudamore (Chief Veterinary Officer), Sir John Krebs (Chairman FSA) and Professor David King (Chief Scientific Adviser) heard reports from Neil Ferguson and colleagues (Imperial College) Mark Woolhouse (University of Edinburgh) and opinions from experts at the Institute of Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories Agency … all the experts advised the need for further drastic action to bring disease under control. Otherwise FMD will become established in Britain.
Speedier slaughter of infected animals will help to reduce transmission. But this needs to be accompanied by immediate slaughter of all susceptible species around infected farms otherwise the final number of cases will be very high. (MAFF 2001)

This became the contiguous cull policy introduced on 26 March, 2001, another crucial date in the media coverage of the epidemic after 21 March, the day of the joint meeting. The contiguous cull began on 29 March, 2001.

Modelling during the epidemic
Initially, four modelling teams and three types of models were used to guide disease control policy during the FMD outbreak: a team from Imperial College under Professors Roy Anderson, Neil Ferguson and Christine Donnelly (Howard and Donnelly 2000) used a deterministic model (more specifically, a mass action model using moment closure to approximate neighbourhood effects); two teams from Cambridge and Edinburgh under Professor Bryan Grenfell from Cambridge and Professor Mark Woolhouse from Edinburgh used a non-deterministic model (more specifically, a spatially explicit Monte Carlo simulation model); this was also the case for the MAFF/Veterinary Laboratories Agency (VLA) team under Professor Wilesmith (more specifically, a spatially explicit microsimulation model – Interspread) (Woolhouse 2003, 128).	
Generally speaking, a deterministic model assumes that for any given state of affairs there will be one particular future that can be predicted. A non-deterministic (probabilistic) model assumes that for any state of affairs there may be several possible futures with differing likelihoods. In a ‘Monte Carlo’ simulation, used by the teams from Cambridge, Edinburgh and the VLA, the computer picks one of the possible futures giving greater weight to those that are most likely and then moves on in time repeating the process.
After 21 March, the date of a crucial meeting convened by MAFF, the deterministic models produced by the Imperial College team under Professor Anderson became the dominant policy tool. However, the conclusions reached by using this type of modelling agreed on the main with those achieved by the other modelling teams, such as that lead by Professor Woolhouse who wrote in 2003:

Based on data collected during the epidemic, prospective modelling using a variety of approaches gave the same conclusions: (i) that the epidemic had not been brought under control by 'traditional' methods, and (ii) that neighbourhood control measures (the contiguous cull) could bring the epidemic under control and result in a net saving of livestock. Retrospective analyses suggest that the subsequent course of the epidemic was consistent with a beneficial impact of the contiguous cull and that it would have been difficult to achieve a better outcome using reactive vaccination, which would have required very large-scale vaccination programmes to have been implemented quickly. (Woolhouse 2003, 126-130)

It should also be stressed that the deterministic model used by the Imperial College team was only part of a much larger interdisciplinary activity, something the media soon lost sight of. As Professor Anderson said in November 2001 in the House of Commons:

First of all, everybody is using the word ‘modelling’. It is important to make the point that, for example, my own department is a very interdisciplinary department, it ranges from molecular biologists through to field veterinary scientists, through the clinical/medical epidemiological area. Modelling was a tool in a set of interdisciplinary skills that were applied to this problem … So it is important to register that this was not just modelling, this was a very interdisciplinary approach. (Anderson 2001)

Modelling and politics
However, despite this complexity, some have claimed that the Imperial model was not complex enough – something of which the modellers were very much aware (Ferguson, et al. 2005). In an article that evaluates the various models (Imperial, Edinburgh/Cambridge and VLA) used during the FMD outbreak, Susan and George Haywood write:

... it should be recognised that quantitative modelling is seductive in that it delivers a result that appears to be objective. In all the models used, it is the spread of the disease that is modelled. Crucially important factors such as preservation of biological diversity in the form of pedigree stock and rare breeds together with the preservation of the rural economy were never part of the models, nor fell within their remit. And yet, it is this aspect that should be regarded as being of primary importance. Only when the complexity inherent within natural systems is fully recognised, and the hopes, fears, aspirations and expectations of all the stakeholders are taken into account, will the quantitative models have their place. (Haywood and Haywood 2004)

Reduction of complexity is inherent in any model. However, this reduction can and often is not only mathematically, but also politically motivated. As Star has pointed out:

First, a formal representation is an abstraction: they take away properties from a particular situation. Second, it is a simplification: it reduces the complexity of real life situations in order to make them formally (usually, but not exclusively, mathematically) tractable. Third, and most important, every formal representation contains choices about what to keep in (what is important) and what to throw out. All such choices are political. (Star 1989, 147)

The Imperial College team first carried out its modelling of the unfolding epidemic out of purely scientific curiosity; later it became part of a political decision making process and the models produced had direct and visible impact in ‘the real world’, something which then reflected back on the models, the way the media reported on them and those who produced them.

FMD, modelling and the media
The outbreak of FMD in the UK as well as its handling by the UK government attracted global attention by the media and by governments. In the UK alone the media coverage was enormous. Although the epidemic peaked in late March, shortly after the introduction of the extended cull policy (Woolhouse 2003, 128), FMD still received media attention well into September 2001. However, by then other world events, specifically the attack on the World Trade Centre in New York on September 11, 2001 and the decline in cases gradually reduced articles to a trickle. This length of coverage of one ‘news story’ is exceptional. As one article pointed out (and that only one month into the epidemic): “Only wars and general elections tend to dominate for a full month. Now foot and mouth has come along to tear up the rulebook. Well into its fifth week, it continues to dominate the headlines but also, more deeply, the national mood.” (Leader 2001) FMD was reported as a ‘war’ at a time of general and local elections (which should have taken place on May 3, 2001, but had to be postponed to June 7) – this might have contributed to the length and depth of its coverage by the press and the profound influence it had on the ‘national mood’.
One of the main issues of contention and debate was the mass slaughter of animals, accelerated by the contiguous cull policy. Many thought that vaccination might be a better way of dealing with the epidemic. A study on the public perceptions of vaccination analysed the content of FMD broadsheet press coverage from the start of the outbreak on 20th February 2001 to the end of August 2001. During the period, there were 498 articles on the FMD vaccination issue alone published in five broadsheets (Breakwell 2002). Compared to this heated debate about vaccination, the debate about epidemiological modelling was rather more subdued.

Modelling and metaphors
Although there exists a bewildering array of definitions of what a model is -- what Wartofsky called the “model muddle” (Wartofsky 1979) -- there “does seem to be general agreement that modelling involves the relationship of representation or correspondence between a (real) target system and something else” (Webb 2001; see also Hughes 1997).
In models a connection is established between what one might call a domain that one wants to control or understand (the target domain -- in our case the spread of FMD or the impact that certain disease control measures have at any moment in time) and another domain which is well-understood, idealised, and in which one can make calculations or predictions which can then be interpreted back onto the domain one wants to control (the computer simulation of the spread of the disease or the impact of control measures). This is comparable to the metaphorical transfer that cognitive linguists, such as Lakoff and Johnson, describe as a mapping between source domains (e.g., journeys) and target domains (e.g., a relationship) (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). By mapping features of the source domain onto the target domain under the guidance of the conceptual metaphor Relationships are journeys, we might say, for example: “We have come to the end of the road. Let’s go our different ways from now on”.
Metaphors always imply a model and models are not easily grasped without the help of metaphor. Both models and metaphors enhance understanding. However, there is understanding and understanding. Some people find it difficult to understand something by just looking at an equation, abstract law or computer model, especially when these deal with invisible phenomena, such as the spread of a virus. As Rom Harré and Mary Hesse have pointed out, to help our understanding, to indeed get a ‘feeling’ that we understand, we need to establish an analogy with a familiar, more experientially grounded, phenomenon (Harré 1960; Hesse 1966). For example, we feel that we understand the behaviour of gas when we conceptualize it as a collection of entities that behave like billiard-balls. The same process is exploited by the media. To give people a feeling of understanding journalists exploit analogies with familiar phenomena. Both science and the media need metaphors and analogies to facilitate understanding.
Both models and metaphors exploit resemblance or similarity relations, but a resemblance that is based on highlighting and hiding selected features of the phenomenon represented via a model or a metaphor (Brown 2003). In both cases, models and metaphors, this highlighting process can be politically motivated or have political implications. As Georg C. Lichtenberg, the 18th-century German physicist, writer and critic once remarked, “We do not think good metaphors are anything very important, but I think that a good metaphor is something even the police should keep an eye on” (Lichtenberg 1990), while for I. A. Richards, a literary critic interested in meaning and metaphor, a command of metaphor plays a role in “the control of the world that we make for ourselves to live in” (Richards 1936, 135-136). In certain circumstances, metaphors don’t just have an aesthetically pleasing meaning or aid scientific discovery and explanation, they have a political force; and in some circumstances mathematical models are not just mathematically elegant and pleasing, they also have real-world consequences. They can also be quite seductive:

... models are extended metaphors that have the potential to guide thinking about a system under investigation, suggesting new directions for research. They also pose a danger: Attachment to a particular model can inhibit thinking in other, possibly more productive ways about the system being studied. (Brown 2003, chapter 2)

In the following I want to examine which metaphors were used to represent the modelling exercise, including the models, the modellers, the policies based on the models and the outcome of the modelling and what argumentative, political force these metaphors had. This will not provide direct insights into the metaphoricity of mathematical models but into the way that models can become political objects in the process of metaphorisation by the media.
As the modelling undertaken at Imperial College became the prime source for political decision-making, the press focused mainly on the models produced there, not the models produced by the Edinburgh and Cambridge teams and the MAFF/Veterinary Laboratories Agency (VLA) team (some members of these teams provided however critical reflections on the dominant model). Only at the very beginning of the outbreak is the term ‘computer model’ used to refer to another type of modelling altogether, as we will see.

Material
The Lexis Nexis database was used to search all UK newspapers between February and July 2001 using the key words ‘foot and mouth’ and ‘modelling’. However, it should be stressed that this data base does not reproduce images or graphs that might accompany newspaper texts. A second search was carried out for ‘foot and mouth’ and ‘epidemiologists’ and brought up a very small number of articles not covered by the first search. Although 33 articles were found, only 18 contained any direct discussion of the modelling exercise, which indicates a relatively limited focus on this issue, perhaps because it was regarded as too complicated and narrow in its appeal to a wider readership. Six articles were analysed in depth, published in The Independent, three in The Daily Telegraph, two in the Western Morning News, one each in The Times, The Guardian, the Evening Standard, the Belfast Newsletter, the Scotsman, The Sunday Telegraph and the Gloucester Citizen. No articles were found in the tabloids – that is to say, there were quite a few hits for ‘modelling’ in The Sun, but that type of modelling was not quite what I was looking for. I also analysed two broadcasts to which the print media referred explicitly: one interview with Professor Roy Anderson on Newsnight and one interview with Professor Paul Kitching on Channel 4.
Results based on such a small sample and one case study can obviously not be generalised and further research into the topic of modelling, media and metaphors will be needed. However, they might provide some indication of the dynamics between the three phenomena.
	In the next sections of the article we follow the convention established in cognitive linguistics to indicate conceptual metaphors, such as Arguments are war in small capitals. Conceptual metaphors are overarching ways of conceptualising relatively abstract ideas in more concrete form, and subsume expressions such as “She shot down his argument”, “He surrendered to her brilliant repartee”; “They fought over the last issue” etc. The metaphorical parts of such expressions will be highlighted in bold.

Media and metaphors – modelling modellers and models
Model-users are detectives and models are detecting and tracing tools
At the very beginning of the epidemic one can still sense a feeling of optimism in the reporting of the impending epidemic, which is reflected in the use of metaphors. Epidemiologists working with what the Evening Standard called a “computer model” (Smith 2001) simulating the airborne spread of the virus are framed as detectives “on the trail of the latest killer virus” (Highfield 2001a). These detectives are seen as ‘old hands’ that have done this type of work before, especially in 1981, when they traced a small outbreak of FMD on the Isle of Wight back to France, and who, everyone expected, would certainly do so again. In this case, well-established metaphors such as Model-Users are detectives and models are detecting tools exploit an existing similarity that has gained currency in medicine since at least the 1850s, where doctors are seen as detectives and vice versa. As Rapazzi, et al. say in their article “White coats and fingerprints: diagnostic reasoning in medicine and investigative methods of fictional detectives”: "’Detective work’ has long been a metaphor for clinical acumen.” (Rapazzi, et al. 2005, 1491).  Epidemiologists in particular are often referred to as ‘disease detectives’.
The epidemiologists referred to by the Evening Standard were veterinary scientists using geographical information systems coupled with knowledge of meteorological conditions, of individual animal identification, and of animal movement or nomadic patterns in conjunction with satellite tracking systems so that patterns of disease can be accurately predicted in real time. This type of (veterinary) modelling, especially for the tracing the movements of plumes of airborne virus, was advocated in particular by Professor Kitching at the Institute for Animal Health at Pirbright in Surrey - the main governmental animal health laboratory in Britain (Kitching 2002, 2004) but was sidelined in the work of the FMD Science Advisory Group. It also turned out that in 2001 aerosol transmission was much less important than in 1967 (Donaldson 2001;  Sørensen, et al. 2000). It should also be pointed out that despite the fact that these scientists used ‘computer models’ they would not call themselves ‘modellers’, a label reserved more prominently for those using predictive quantitative mathematical models (Neil Ferguson, p.c.).

Modellers are soldiers and models are weapons
By the beginning of March this relatively optimistic picture according to which a disease is tracked down and eradicated is replaced by two other images. In one, Professors Anderson and Ferguson (from the Imperial College team of epidemiological modellers) become prophets of doom (see the Newsnight interview referred to above in which Professor Anderson remarked that the epidemic was out of control); in the other Professor Anderson and his team of modellers become soldiers and heroes in the fight against the epidemic. Here a metaphor imposes a new similarity relation between modellers and their work, which reflects a change in expectations, social framing and, ultimately, policy, from ‘tracking’ models to ‘tactical’ models. The issue of ‘tracing’ the virus back to its hiding place is replaced by the issue of ‘controlling’ the spread of the virus, a spread that is increasingly seen to be ‘out of control’. The focus switches from mapping and monitoring to controlling (as well as from meteorological ‘modelling’ to quantitative and predictive ‘modelling’) and models are no longer predominantly used to trace the virus back to where it came from but to project ways of how the virus could be controlled on its way forward through the national herd. As Kitching has recently pointed out: “Whereas previous FMD models had become tools for institutions with experience of FMD, the 2001 models were constructed to substantiate or justify particular forms of control.” (Kitching, et al. 2005)
This change in policy and metaphorical representation from tracing back to tracing forward and from geographical to mathematical modelling signalled a fundamentally new FMD policy in which mathematical expertise seemed to be more valuable than veterinary expertise (Bickerstaff and Simmons 2004). This relative shift in focus which brought with it a perceived shift in the value attached to one form of expertise over another was controversial, as Professor Kitching himself told Channel 4 news: “I think this aspect of the whole handling of the outbreak is controversial. The modellers produced some very seductive graphs which would indicate [where] the virus is going, what the disease outbreak is likely to be in the future.” (Kitching [interview] 2001) We shall come back to the topic of seduction in a later section of the article.
Based on predictions made by the models, a situation could be imagined in which the disease was no longer out of control, but only if the policy recommendations that emerged from the model were adhered to, that is, if the imagined future was mapped onto the present.

When the epidemic is modelled using the current report-to-slaughter times it is “out of control”, he [Professor David King] said. But if the times could be reduced to 24 hours, the models show the epidemic could be controlled. (Hawkes 2001)

Achieving disease control was not only important in terms of ending the epidemic but it also had political implications for a government that seemed to have lost control over the disease, but was at the same time fighting a general election. This struggle for control is sometimes depicted as heroic, especially in metaphorically framed headlines, such as “Has the A-team [a, somewhat tongue-in-cheek reference to a famous TV series that ran from 1983 to 1997, in which Four Vietnam veterans, framed for a crime they didn't commit, help the innocent while on the run from the military] defeated the virus? The fight against foot and mouth has been spearheaded by a task force of epidemiologists – their weapon is clever software” (Highfield 2001b).
Whereas at the very beginning of the epidemic models were conceptualised as a device used by a clever detective, models are now also conceptualised as weapons in a war or in “a struggle against the odds”. The virus is still the villain, but the modellers are not just tracking it but waging war against it. In this context the models turn from being instruments used by detectives to being modern precision tools used by soldiers. Both metaphorical image fields, of the virus as a criminal and of the virus as an enemy in a war were part of a cluster of such image fields, what Weinrich (1966) called Bildfelder, used widely by the media during the outbreak (see Nerlich, et al. 2002) in which the imagery of war, weapons, fight and battle took on a particular importance (Nerlich 2004; Larson, et al. 2005). Initially used as quasi-automatic ways to report on the ‘fight against an infectious disease’ (Sarasin 2004) the war-related imagery that resulted from the culling/killing/slaughter of millions of real animals cast these everyday metaphors in a new visual light and revitalised associations to other potent image fields from medieval funeral pyres to the aftermath of the atom bomb. In the context of modelling the war/weapon imagery also flipped from evoking positive and heroic associations to evoking negative and destructive ones, as we shall see.
The use of the metaphor models are weapons was not unique to the UK newspapers though. It was also exploited by the Royal Society who wrote in their report Infectious diseases in livestock that mathematical models “ought to become a welcome weapon in the armoury of those charged with protecting our livestock from these devastating events” (Royal Society 2002). Models as weapons, used both to defeat FMD and to protect against FMD, had been tested in the 2001 outbreak and proven their worth, at least in the eyes of the Royal Society.

Modellers are engineers and models are workaday tools
This use of the term weapon by the Royal Society can be regarded as the quasi-automatic use of an almost dead metaphor, whereas some of the newspaper articles set this metaphor in a context that revitalised its war-like associations. It is much more likely to assume that both the Royal Society and Professor Anderson regarded models as straightforward engineering tools, which were, however, in this case applied to a disease scenario. One newspaper quotes Professor Anderson first indirectly, then directly on this matter:

The foot and mouth crisis marks perhaps the first serious test in medicine of computer predictions, a workaday tool in other fields, said Prof Anderson ... "Medicine very rarely uses these sophisticated computational and mathematical methods that are used routinely in engineering and physics," he said. (Highfield 2001b)

This mapping of the image of the engineer designing aeroplanes onto engineers ‘designing’ the course of an epidemic might have been chosen to reassure the public and to stress that control can be achieved. Again, this is echoed in the Royal Society report: “In other areas of science, the fruitful interplay between theory [often expressed in sophisticated mathematical terms] and down-to-earth practicality is commonplace. Such an interplay puts, for instance, increasingly efficient aircraft in the sky.” (Royal Society 2002, 57-58) However, Anderson’s voice of reason clashes with journalistic hyperbole when modellers become wizards and even Gods.

Modellers are wizards and models are crystal balls
In a lengthy article on modelling the work done by Professor Anderson’s team of modellers at Imperial College is described in the following way (not forgetting to point out the complexity of the whole enterprise):

They plugged in their supercomputer and set up workstations in a chain of tatty terrace houses adjacent to the Grand Union Canal, the temporary home of what will this year become the Department of Infectious Disease Epidemiology at Imperial's Medical School, the biggest concentration of clinical scientists and epidemiologists in Britain.
The team boasts a range of expertise: computer models of how a virus multiplies within the body; experts who conduct field studies of disease; most relevant, statisticians, software wizards and mathematicians who can set up and run computer models that can predict the impact of MMR scares, novel Aids treatments or cattle culls.
The foot and mouth crisis marks perhaps the first serious test in medicine of computer predictions, a workaday tool in other fields, said Prof Anderson: just as engineers use computers to alter the design of an aeroplane, even crash it, it is now possible to play God with an epidemic. (Highfield 2001b)

Software is portrayed as a clever weapon, but it is also conceptualised as magic, which corresponds to a quite widespread view of science in general. As Brown wrote in Making Truth: Metaphor in Science: “For many, science is viewed as a form of magic that can be practiced only after long apprenticeship. What scientists actually do and how they go about doing it are mysteries.” (Brown 2003, chapter 2) This mystery is compounded when science enters the arena of quantitative modelling. The aura of ‘mystique’ surrounding science is enhanced, as the difficulties in understanding this field or getting a ‘feel’ for it increase.
In the right hands, especially those of ‘software wizards’, magical or wizardly stuff, such as computer software, can assume supernatural powers and those using it can become Gods and play God with epidemics (here playing God is used in a positive sense, as opposed to the use of that phrase in reporting on advances in genetics and genomics, for example). This image of the modeller is quite far removed from the Sherlock Holmesian image evoked at the very beginning of the epidemic, but it is still positive.
This magical image of epidemiological modelling is further enhanced by comparing modelling to gazing into a crystal ball. However, the cultural knowledge surrounding crystal ball gazing might also highlight the possible pitfalls of this new type of modelling. It can see the future, but are the forecasts perhaps just an illusion? This aspect is not salient in the article though, where the focus is on prediction (again, as with the previous quote, the voice of the expert mingles with that of the journalist who gives it a, perhaps quite unwanted, metaphorical twist).

Imperial aims to become the leading exponent of computerised crystal-ball gazing to predict the spread of disease. "This proved crucial with foot and mouth," he [Anderson] said. (Highfield 2001b)

Modellers as magicians are contrasted in the article with “’shoe leather’ epidemiologists working hard on farms across the country to detect infections and trace contacts”. Here the contrast between old-fashioned detective work and technologically advanced modelling work comes to the fore again. This distinction between field epidemiologists and modellers was certainly not meant to be denigrating the input from the field workers, but it provides an indication of the cultural difference between the two groups of scientists, the modellers and the veterinary experts which led to some friction during the crisis (Bickerstaff and Simmons 2004).

Models are the disease
Both shoe-leather epidemiologists and epidemiological modelling wizards implicitly or explicitly personified the FMD virus as an autonomous agent that can outwit human agents, especially if that agent is MAFF. However, the modellers hoped that the virus might not be able to outwit the computers. The race was on between the disease and the models of the disease, between ancient plague and modern technology (see Nerlich, et al. 2002).
In this process the epidemic and the disease were metonymically mapped onto the model and vice versa. These metonymies and more subtle metaphors were not used by the journalists but by those directly involved in the modelling exercise and quoted by the journalists, Sir David King (the Government Chief Scientific Advisor) in particular. For the modellers and political decision makers the model, and especially the graphs that it produced, became the disease – but a disease that was an abstraction, removed from the bloodshed happening on the ground (Bickerstaff and Simmons 2004) a bloodshed that was practically and visually magnified after the introduction of the contiguous cull or 24/48 hour policy. This type of visuality (the images of mass pyres and burial trenches) clashed with the visuality of the abstract charts, graphs on which the scientists focused their attention. In one mode ‘the disease’ conjured up an array of medieval images of fire, hell and plague, in the other mode ‘the disease’ waxed and waned in two-dimensional graph space. In both modes of visuality the technology, i.e. the modelling, became itself invisible; what remained visible were on the one hand its results in the form of policies which themselves were transformed into actions and finally into dead bodies and on the other its results in the form of graphs:

Culling infected animals within 24 hours of a positive diagnosis on a farm and killing all animals on neighbouring farms within 48 hours could result in the epidemic peaking within the next seven days, Professor King said (Connor 2001).

The 24/48-hour policy introduced on the 22 March appears to have stopped the exponential increase in the epidemic, with new cases following a diminishing curve that is set almost to peter out by the time of an expected June election.
Professor King said: "Nobody is saying that this epidemic can just be switched off…" (Connor 2001).

The government's chief scientific adviser, Professor David King, said on Wednesday that the epidemic was "flattening out." (Anonymous a 2001)

If the models were accurate, the number of new cases would tail off over the summer. (Connor 2001)

undiagnosed farms surfaced in the data (Highfield 2001b)

The clash between war-like imagery on the ground and graph imagery in the sphere of policy might have contributed to gradually shifting the value of the images associated with the modelling exercise from positive to negative.
Although outside our sample, this section of an interview with Sir David King on 15 September 2005 provides further insights into the way policy-makers saw the models they were using. Unlike the farmers who personified the disease, policy-makers personified models: “Now, the private owner of those farms was saying, ‘But my animals are perfectly healthy.’ And my model was saying, ‘They may be healthy today but if they go down tomorrow, your animals will become a virus factory and the epidemic just continues.’ So, the model was saying do that, but many of the farmers were objecting. That's the point where I found myself going on television to explain to the public the basis of the model, that at the end of the day the number of animals we'd have to cull would be considerably reduced by switching off the epidemic rapidly at the expense of taking out the animals on these farms.“ (Kreisler 2005) The question was: who would win - the disease or the model? 

Modelling-based policies are animals
At the same time as diseased and dead animals became graphs, policies derived from the models and implemented to reduce the spread of the disease became animals.

POLICIES TO curb the spread of foot-and-mouth disease are "beginning to bite", according to a computer analysis released yesterday by Professor David King, the Government's chief scientific adviser. (Connor 2001)

This view was, however, not accepted by everybody. There was a constant argument about whether the disease was under control or out of control, that is to say, about who had control over whom: the disease over the modellers or the modellers and their models over the disease.

Models are outdated weapons
A range of metaphors were used to criticise the models used to control the disease or to show that the disease was ‘under control’. One metaphor focused on the novelty of using quantitative modelling in real-time disease-control management. Modelling was not seen as breaking new ground in disease control but as entering foreign (and therefore dangerous) ground:

We are therefore in uncharted territory in the use of control by slaughter for national or international foot-and-mouth disease control. (Sumption 2001)

Others turned the metaphor of the model as a super-weapon and precision tool on its head and the new weapon became an imprecise or medieval piece of armoury. Such metaphors were especially prominent in the critique of the contiguous cull policy, which other academic commentators also called ‘carnage by computer’ (Campbell and Lee 2003):

But he [Scudamore] was overlooked and a scatter-gun approach was taken, slaughtering all animals within 48 hours of confirmation of each new case. (Anonymous b 2001)

The blanket ring culls used for much of the epidemic were "a blunderbuss approach", said Dr Alex Donaldson, of Pirbright, who gave the Government his preliminary findings on April 19. (Highfield 2001b)

From this we can see that some of those who did not agree with the outcome of the modelling exercise and who felt excluded from the policy making process criticised its method, equating it with an indiscriminate weapon, rather than highlighting the value decisions, which might be sequential and gradual, which led to the slaughter.

Models are illusions and lies
In a final metaphorical twist, models came to be seen as a form of seduction and were criticised as such (Haywood and Haywood 2001):

No one has been more forthright in criticising the shortcomings of this model than Dr Kitching, head of the foot and mouth world reference centre at Pirbright. In an interview on Channel Four News, he said that the modellers had come up with "some very seductive graphs" showing how the epidemic might develop. But the epidemiological data available to be fed into the computer was so inadequate that "one has to question the value of the data coming out". (Booker 2001)

And finally, the same article that quotes Kitching comes to the conclusion that, as the headline proclaims: “Foot and mouth figures [were] massaged to help the election” and argued that the models and their numerical values were just “DAMNED LIES AND STATISTICS” (Booker 2001) – a way of describing the use of statistics in modelling that can itself be called a blunderbuss approach, based on well-established cultural stereotypes surrounding ‘statistics’. Booker does not really criticise the model but states that the model outputs were deficient because the input data were defective or too limited. There was also some suspicion surrounding graphs that showed that the epidemic would come under control just after the (postponed) general election on 7 July, 2001 – a coincidence of model and reality that some found suspicious. David Curry, MP for Skipton and Ripon, for example, told the House of Commons on 21 June 2001:

When the rest of the country believed that things were over—indeed, the government were telling us that the disease was under control and all the graphs happily pointed to it petering out on or about 7 June [date of the general election]—we had a virulent, violent and destructive outbreak that consumed all other activity … Not merely did the world not know about the outbreak, it did not want to know about it. (Curry 2001)

Conclusion
The metaphors used by the journalists to make sense of quantitative epidemiological modelling in 2001 mostly exploited a metonymical network of associations that surrounds the concept of a model, but leaves the model itself empty like a metaphorical black box that was too difficult to penetrate. ‘Black box’ is used here in the ordinary (metaphorical) sense rather than the Latourian one, where ‘blackboxing’ refers to the way scientific and technical work is made invisible by its own success (Latour 1999). In our case, by contrast, the deadly results of the modelling made the links around the modelling black box more visible. The model became an (invisible) actor in Latour’s sense and the actor was defined by its (visible) performances.
So, instead of focusing on the (invisible) models, metaphors focused on a network of (visible) links or ‘actors’ around it, i.e. agents (modellers, politicians), inputs (the type and ‘goodness’ of data), outputs (graphs), the use of the models (as weapons for example) and their outcomes (policies and results of policies, i.e. the killing of animals). The metaphors used to conceptualise these links in the modelling network were rather conventional, tapping, amongst others, into cultural knowledge of war, wizardry and weapons. The novelty of the scientific and technological tool did not provoke the use of novel metaphors, rather the opposite.
Unlike some of the journalists, the experts themselves either avoided the metaphorical hyping up of modelling power, preferring to refer to it as a workaday tool, or used a standard form of modelling or statistic ‘talk’ which clashed however with concrete, emotive and bloody happenings on the ground, provoking a backlash of the images that portrayed the results of modelling-driven policy onto the modellers and the value of the models.
Over the course of the epidemic one can observe a gradual variation in and perhaps change of the metaphors used and of their affective values; from seeing modellers as detectives and models as mapping tools to seeing modellers as heroes and models as precision weapons, to seeing modellers as villains and models as defective weapons. There was also a shift in the use of metaphors which were first used as epistemic tools to raise social awareness of (and also to glorify) a new type of scientific tool used in political decision making and intervention towards a more sustained critique of this new tool. This seems to indicate a change in the press coverage from portraying models as a legitimate and ‘objective’ basis used by decision makers to pursue science-based policies towards seeing models as tools used to legitimise increasingly difficult political decisions (e.g. the contiguous cull) and finally towards seeing them as a political tool used in the fight not against the disease but in the general election. However, it should be stressed that here, as in all reconstructed diachronic processes, the ‘shift’ was gradual and overlaps occurred between sometimes ambivalent metaphors.
The differences in metaphorical framing of the modelling exercise seem to have had two causes. At first the models, whose abstract nature was poorly understood, could be ‘glamorised’ by the use of heroic metaphors. Later in the epidemic the results of the policies based on modelling became apparent in the increasing (and increasingly visible) death-toll of the animals slaughtered. These outcomes of the models then reflected back on the modellers and policy makers who could no longer be seen as heroes of this slaughter policy but came to be seen as being seduced by the tools they used – a shift in image, one could say, from wizards using magical tools to sorcerers’ apprentices who can’t handle the power of magic.
Those directly affected by FMD control policies, experts who felt excluded or were dissatisfied with the way modelling and policy interacted, and the journalists who reported on this matter began to question the selection of modellers, the data used and the expertise of the modellers and decision makers, especially that of the head of the FMD Science Advisory Group, Sir David King, derogatively described by Christopher Booker of the Daily Telegraph as “a chemist whose speciality is given in Who's Who as ‘surface science’”. (Booker 2001) The Western Morning News, a vocal critic of the FMD policy, claimed that “[p]rivately, some industry leaders describe the Blair-King axis as political interference of the worst kind, making a bad situation worse”. (Anonymous b 2001)
As Bickerstaff and Simmons have pointed out in their seminal article on the clash between two types of expertise, modelling and veterinarian, during the crisis, the modelling exercise highlighted questions about the relation between scientific knowledge, expertise and political decision making.

The initial membership of the FMD Science Group, the core of which was the four groups of modelers, and the immediate adoption of the contiguous-cull policy arguably meant that consideration of any alternative scientific (and nonscientific) constructions of risk (and risk management) were effectively closed off, thus blurring the line between scientists advising on policy and scientists making policy. In the words of the CSA [Chief Scientific Advisor, Sir David King]: “We had calculated a whole range of scenarios but I simply said that this is the one that will work. So it wasn’t a matter of giving what I thought would be a confusing set of options.” (Adam 2001, 472-473; quoted by Bickerstaff and Simmons 2004, 399)

The gradual shift in the value of the metaphors used, from positive to negative, highlighted emergent issues of trust in the modelling exercise and raised questions of the perceived institutional roles of scientific knowledge (Yearley 1999, 853).
As pointed out at the beginning of this paper, both models and metaphors highlight and hide, simplify and abstract. When the newspaper articles compare models to crystal-ball gazing or reduce the use of statistics to lies, they highlight some aspects of the modelling exercise but hide others, such as its complexity and interdisciplinarity. And just as modellers may be seduced by the models they create, so journalists may be seduced by the metaphorical models and clichés that provide them with shortcuts through complex scientific debates and that provide readers with images that might be clearer and more comprehensible than the complex situation they represent.
Vaihinger (1924) and Black (1962) talked about models and metaphors as heuristic ‘fictions’; Morgan and Morrison have called models ‘mediators’ between scientific theories and the world (Morgan and Morrison 1999); Maasen and Weingart (2000) have called metaphors ‘messengers’ of meaning between various domains of knowledge and between science and society in particular. In our case the metaphors used by the media became mediators between scientific modelling and the wider public. These metaphors all tapped into deep-rooted domains of everyday cultural knowledge about detectives, wizards or weapons. These rather simplistic and reductionist images did not really convey the complex, abstract and mathematical nature of the models, just as the abstract mathematical models did not manage to reflect the concrete and complex nature of the epidemic. Journalists told stories using well-known story telling tools, just as modellers constructed stories, scenarios or predictions using well-known mathematical tools. 

Each story conveys a very different view of reality and represents a special way of seeing. From a problematic situation that is vague, ambiguous, and indeterminate (or rich and complex, depending on ones frame of mind), each story selects and names different features and relations that become the ‘things’ of the story—what the story is about. … Each story places the features it has selected within the frame of a particular context …
Each story constructs its view of social reality through a complementary process of naming and framing … They select for attention a few salient features and relations from what would otherwise be an overwhelmingly complex reality. They give these elements a coherent organization … Through the process of naming and framing, the stories make the ‘normative leap’ from data to recommendations, from fact to values, from “is” to “ought”. (Schön and Rein 1994, 26)

I don’t want to argue that quantitative epidemiological models are the same as metaphors used by the media. However, there are similarities, some of which have been highlighted in the previous quote from a seminal book on policy controversies and the role of metaphors, frames and stories. Both, models and metaphors, map the known onto the unknown (Rothbart 2004) both proceed by a process of reduction of complexity, both can be used to make normative leaps from is to ought, both can be revised as new ‘data’ come in and in both cases users can be seduced by their elegance. In our case the use of metaphors varied both in response to a switch from one type of model to another, as well as in response the impact that modelling had on the life of animals and humans.
In Gabrielle Hecht’s terms, the models (as instruments or technologies) began to be seen as part of a technopolitical regime, where ‘technopolitics’ refers to the strategic practice of designing or using technology to constitute, embody, or enact political goals (Hecht 1998). In the transition from lab to media and from science to society models, modellers and metaphors became politicised and the object of political criticism. The workaday tool used by modellers was transformed into an actor, be it an heroic or villainous one, on the political scene; an actor that was ultimately judged not by what it achieved – bringing the epidemic under control – but by its visible performance – the accumulation of carcasses.
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^1	 For a study of the developing metaphorical frameworks used by scientists and the media in response to the avian influenza pandemic threat, see Brigitte Nerlich, “Avian influenza: The creation of expectations in the interplay between scientists and the media.” Sociology of Health and Illness. in press.

